The field of provenance in computer science arose from the need to capture the lineage of software data outputs in an automated manner that is semantically consistent across various applications that participated in producing the said outputs. This vision being outside the capabilities of simple text logs, a series of Provenance Challenges investigated the suitability of different approaches, in the process giving rise to the Open Provenance Model (OPM) [3] , currently being reworked into PROV, a W3C standard.
The transform element specifies if and how the graph is transformed to allow access to a subgraph when either deny or necessary permit policies apply to some nodes within the scope. There are three possible values: None denotes that transformations are not allowed and no part of the graph can be returned, Single means that the graph may be transformed and modified version returned, and Subgraph which also allows graph transformation, and also transfers the access restriction to its children nodes. The scope of this transfer depends on the value of the transformation scope element, which can be either a set of resources, defined through a path query, or 'all' for all reachable nodes.
The example of a fictional EHR system in Figure 1 shows a patient access policy: the patient has no access to any EHRs other than their own, neither to any information associated to a diagnosis that was generated by using an automatic diagnosis recommendation process (ocld:DiagRecommProcess) and to the subgraph connecting it with the clinical evidences.
Our query evaluation strategy aims to transform the response graphs so that they conform to the query requestor's authorisation level. In rule conflicts, the strategy takes a wider-allowed-access-takes-precedence approach [2] , i.e. the algorithm guarantees access to all resources that are not a target of a specific deny rule. The evaluation pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 1.
To construct the transformed graph, we distinguish between causality-preserving and non-causality-preserving transformations. The former maintain some causal links between remaining nodes (through previous inferred relations), while the latter change the semantics by removing all connections between some remaining nodes. The algorithm removes all excluded nodes while the overall transformation remains causality-preserving, and when this is not the case, it replaces deleted nodes with the minimal set of fictitious artifacts and processes) that act as place-holders for one or more deleted nodes, and maintain the causal dependencies of remaining nodes. This is shown in Algorithm 2.
In this paper, we introduced a novel query evaluation algorithm on provenance data that returns graphs transformed based on user's authorisation levels, and the corresponding extension to XACL to support this in policy definition. The system is currently being implemented.
